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MEDICAL PROCESS PATENTS: CAN WE LIVE
WITHOUT THEM? SHOULD WE?
"Imagine if somebody held the patent on taking a
patient's temperature under the tongue and charged
a royalty of $1 each time this was done." '
I. INTRODUCTION
Throughout history, the United States Patent and Trademark
Office (PTO) has liberally granted patents2 for inventions that did
not meet the statutory definition of a patentable subject in past
decades.3  Congress, pursuant to its constitutionally derived
power,4 granted the PTO the authority to issue or deny patent
applications. With the advent of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit,5 more patents have been held
valid than were valid prior to its creation.6 The PTO has inter-
preted the Patent Act as allowing patents for medical procedures
1 H. Dunbar Hoskins Jr., M.D., Letters to the Editor: Doctors Group Opposes Medical
Method Patents, WALL ST. J., Sept. 6, 1994, at A13.
2 Act of April 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-294
(1988)) [hereinafter Patent Act].
' Congress has made four major revisions in the Patent Act The latest changed the word
.art" to "process" in defining patentable subject matter. See infra notes 23-24 and
accompanying text (discussing significant changes in Patent Act since 1793). See also
Gregory F. Burch, Note, Ethical Considerations in the Patenting of Medical Processes, 65 TEX.
L. REV. 1139, 1145-46 (1987) (discussing recent developments in medical patent law).
4 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
' See Federal Courts Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.) (creating federal appellate court with subject
matter jurisdiction for patent, government contracts, merit
system protection, tax, trademark, and international trade cases).
" The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals was created in 1982 and has been deemed a
"propatent" court by commentators. ROGER M. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON LICENSING § 2.67, at
2-66 (1990). See also Gerald Sobel, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: A Fifth
Anniversary Look at Its Impact on Patent Law and Litigation, 37 AM. U. L. REV. 1087, 1089
(1988). Important changes since the advent of the Court as the sole appellate court for
patent cases include "a climate more favorable to upholding the validity, and particularly the
non-obviousness of patents." Id. "The court has strengthened the statutory presumption of
validity.... [thereby increasing] the likelihood of relief against infringement." Id. "The new
court is upholding patents 80% of the time vs. 30% under the previous system." Paula
Dwyer et al., The Battle Raging Over 'Intellectual Property,' 3106 Bus. WK. 78, 79 (May 22,
1989).
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and has granted at least twenty-eight medical process patents since
1975. 7
Patents secured for medical processes are unnecessary because
the goals of the Patent Act' can be achieved without producing a
monopoly that deprives the public of useful and potentially life-
saving procedures. The dispensibility of the patent system in
regard to medical process patents is apparent upon examination of
the availability and cost of medical processes in other countries.
For example, in Great Britain and New Zealand, where medical
process patents are prohibited,9 all of the medical processes and
procedures available to the public were developed without patent
protection. The lower cost and availability of numerous procedures
demonstrate that medical process patents are not necessary for the
development of medical technology. The lack of need for patent
protection of medical processes is also illustrated by the numerous
medical developments in the United States that were not protect-
ed.10
Other inventions, including computer programs, were also
successfully developed without the aid of patent protection. Many
programs are not patentable for reasons that apply to medical
processes. However, software has increasingly been held patent-
able subject matter as a result of the industry mushrooming during
the 1980's. The plight of the computer industry, resulting from
increased patentability of processes, should serve as a warning to
those advocating medical process patents without first looking at
the consequences that lay ahead.
These medical process patents are also unethical, not only in a
7 Burch, 8upra note 3, at 1143.
' The goals of the patent system are to promote science and advance the arts "looking to
the general welfare of the Nation." Burch, supra note 3, at 1147 n.48 (quoting Sinclair &
Carrol Co. v. Interchemical Corp., 325 U.S. 327, 331 n.1 (1945)). "The patent system aims
to promote scientific and technological progress by granting exclusive rights in new
discoveries.' Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights
and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1086 (1989) [hereinafter Progress of Science].
9 Counter to the English system, the United States has allowed medical-method patents
since the 1950s. Edward Felsenthal, Medical Patents Trigger Debate Among Doctors, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 11, 1994, at B1.
10 See infra notes 65-72 and accompanying text (discussing medical developments in
United States not protected by patents).
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societal context where patients will be denied a superior treat-
ment," but also in a professional context. Doctors will be faced
with conflicts of interest not present in the traditional treatment of
patients where the doctors have no patent infringement worries.
The ethical considerations not only effect the doctor-patient
relationship, but the patenting of these processes also impacts the
research undertaken by physicians and universities because these
patents are at odds with the goals and beliefs of the scientific
community.
Because medical process patents are unlikely to be prohibited in
the United States, despite successful prohibition in foreign nations
and successful development of unpatented procedures in this
country, this Note offers a temperate approach. This Note will
show that the effect of medical process patents can be minimized
through the licensing agreements many patentees seek as a means
of cashing in on their invention. Although the effect might be
minimal, the American Medical Association and other physicians'
organizations could set standards and issue opinions regarding
proper licensing practices. Because licensing agreements are a
matter of state contract law, any dispute arising under the
agreement could be brought into a state court that may not have
such a propatent bias as the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals. This
would increase the chance that the process patent would be
invalidated.
The harsh effect of these process patents, therefore, can be
softened by ensuring reasonable fees for and availability of
licensing agreements through action by state physician licensing
boards. Professional organizations and doctors, many of whom
disagree with process patenting, 2 can administratively encourage
their colleagues to respond ethically and responsibly to the
temptation of patenting. Limits placed on licensing agreements
will be an effective way to control health care costs that normally
"1 Patients will be denied treatment for various reasons including: their doctor is not
licensed to perform the procedure; the cost of the newly patented procedure is substantially
more than the cost of an older procedure, which is now considered riskier or less efficient;
and, the patentee has not granted a license to anyone while the wait for the new procedure
is too long for an acute illness requiring immediate treatment.
12 
'The [American Medical Association] and several other physicians groups have passed
resolutions urging Congress to bar method patents." Felsenthal, supra note 9.
1995] 163
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increase with patent protection. 13
Hospitals could amend by-laws to include licensing provisions
expressing a reasonable license fee and possible sanctions for
exorbitant fees. They could also use physician employment
contracts as a means of controlling the patent process.
This Note advocates a moderate approach to reducing the number
and effect of medical process patents through responsible licensing
and contract law. Yet, the grim destiny of these patents, as
illustrated by the PTO's and court's treatment of computer program
patenting, demands that prohibition become a goal in the near
future.
II. BACKGROUND
A. HISTORY OF PATENT LAW
The United States Constitution grants Congress the power "[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries." 4 While this clause includes
the Copyright Clause, the Patent Clause has generally been
regarded as "[the promotion of] ... the Arts . .. by securing for
limited Times to ... Inventors the exclusive Right to their respec-
tive ... Discoveries."15
" Pamela Samuelson, Arguing for Patents; Innovation and Competition: Conflicts over
Intellectual Property Rights in New Technologies, in OWNING SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL
INFORMATION: VALUE AND ETHICAL IssuEs 169 (Vivian Weil & John W. Snapper eds., 1989)
[hereinafter Innovation and Competition]. "(Private research firms] will have no compunc-
tion about charging prices for the medical invention considerably in excess of what would
prevail if there was no patent. Given the risk they took and the capital they invested in
research and development, the companies may feel these high prices are well justified." Id.
at 183-84.
14 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
"' At least one physician/inventor has noted that there is a fine line distinguishing
copyright protection from patent protection in the field of biotechnology. Telephone
Interview with Lee D. Kaplan, M.D. (March 8, 1995). Kaplan explained the difference from
an inventor's standpoint, "If I were to publish a paper about a new surgical technique, it
would be copyrighted. People would have to cite to my paper if they used it. If I invent a
surgical technique and patent it, I will get paid every time someone uses it." Id. The fine
line Kaplan refers to is essentially the difference between recognition and royalties. See
infra notes 121-129 and accompanying text (discussing conflict between goals of scientific
community and those of patent system). See also Pamela Samuelson et.al., A Manifesto
164 [Vol. 3:161
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The practice of granting patents to inventors dates back to the
Middle Ages in Europe.16  Patent law in the United States is
largely derived from the English patent system which dates back
to 1623."7 Ironically, those countries from where the United
States' patent system was derived have consistently denied and
prohibited such patent protection.
8
Congress enacted the first Patent Act in 1790.19 Despite the
lack of express language conferring patent protection on processes,
the courts interpreted the statute as allowing for process patent
protection.20 The current Patent Act grants an inventor the
exclusive right to maintain a monopoly on the invention for 17
years from the date the patent issues in exchange for full disclosure
of the novel, useful, and nonobvious invention.21 The evolution of
the Patent Act, through its subsequent amendments,22 liberalized
the definitions and interpretations for patentable subject matter.
As an example, the 1952 revision replaced the word "art" with
"process" so that the Patent Act currently allows patentable
processes.23 This change in terminology simply requires less
Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 2308, 2346-47
(1994) (noting that boundary line between scope of copyright protection and that of patent
protection is uncertain). See infra notes 94-107 and accompanying text (discussing
similarities of theories for rejecting both software and medical process patents).
'
6 Timothy J. McCoy, Biomedical Process Patents: Should They be Restricted by Ethical
Limitations?, 13 J. LEGAL MED. 501, n.2 (1992) (citing Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary
Rights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177, 180 n.7 (1987)
[hereinafter Norms of Science]).
'7 The English Statute of Monopolies, 1623, 21 Jac., ch. 3, marks the origination of patent
law. Norms of Science, supra note 16, at 180 n.7.
"s See Felsenthal, supra note 9, at B1 (discussing difference between English and
American patent systems regarding medical processes).
'g Act of April 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109.
• See McCoy, supra note 16, at 505 (discussing courts' interpretation of work "art").
21 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-103, 154 (1988). See generally ROBERT P. MERGES, PATENT LAW AND
POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 30 (1992) (discussing rights available to inventors under
Patent Act upon full disclosure of invention).
2 Congress significantly revised the Patent Act four times. Burch, supra note 3, at 1145
n.34. Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318; Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 356, 5 Stat. 117; Act
of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198; Act of July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1071 (1982 & Supp. II 1984), and 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-293 (1982 & Supp.
II 1984)). Id.
'3 "Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent
therefor.... ." 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
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interpretation by the courts, since process patents enjoyed judicial
protection under the 1793 Act.24
Despite the broad language of the Patent Act, those promoting
process patents for biotechnology argue that Congress should
modify the test for obtaining process patents. 25  The Biotech
Process Patent Protection Act of 1995 would overrule a case
frequently cited by the Patent Office as grounds for denying biotech
patents,26 making it easier to obtain a biotechnology process
patent.
Currently, the patent laws in the United States broadly view the
requirements for a proper patentable subject.27 After the 1952
revision to the Patent Act, the courts became even more liberal in
upholding process patents. In Ex parte Scherer,'8 the court held
that medical or surgical techniques were not categorically excluded
by the statutory definition of "process." 29 The trend, both judicial-
ly and legislatively, "is towards increasing availability of patent
protection for biotechnology-related inventions." °
A process was considered a form of "art" under the 1793 Act. McCoy, supra note 16,
at 505 n.22.
25 141 CONG. REC. E129-02 (daily ed. Jan. 19, 1995) (statement of Hon. Moorhead),
available in WESTLAW, 1995 WL 19048. Notably, Hon. Moorhead, of California, justified
the bill by emphasizing that it will put people to work and save lives, as well as protect
against foreign competitors. Id. "The biotech industry is an immensely important industry
started in the United States with many labs housed in California." Id.
' Id. The court in In re Durden held that "a new process may still be obvious, even when
considered 'as a whole,' notwithstanding the specific starting material or resulting product,
or both, is not to be found in the prior art." 763 F.2d 1406, 1410, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 359
(Fed. Cir. 1985).
27 Congress, in 1952, noted the breadth of patentable subject matter by stating
"everything under the sun invented by man [is patentable]." See also MILGRIM, supra note
6, § 2.14, at 2-20 (noting that notion of process is construed broadly enough to encompass
electromagnetic forces and surgical accomplishments).
28 103 U.S.P.Q. 107 (P.O. Bd. App. 1954). Ex parte Scherer expressly overruled ex parte
Brinkerhoff, 24 Off. Gaz. Pat. 349 (Comm'r Pat. Off. 1883), "to the extent that Brinkerhoff
[held] ... that all medical or surgical methods [were] unpatentable subject matter merely
because they involve treating the human body. .. ." Id. at 110.
29 See generally PETER D. ROSENBERG, PATENT LAw FUNDAMENTALS § 6.01(1] (2d ed.
1980) (examining composition of statutory process and requirements of statutory subject
matter). See infra notes 34-37 and accompanying text (discussing statutory definition of
"process' and its interpretation in courts).
o Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Norms of Science, supra note 16, at 190. "The PTO 'now
considers nonnaturally occurring nonhuman multicellular living organisms, including
animals, to be patentable subject matter within the scope of 35 U.S.C. [§1 101' " according
to the Commissioner of Patents. Id. at 189.
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B. TYPES OF PATENTS
Three categories of patents are recognized in the United States:
utility, design, and plant.31
Utility patents32 deal with how useful an invention is-"the way
it operates or works to achieve a useful end."
31
Generally, process 34 patents are categorized as utility patents.
Biotechnology patents, which are usually utility patents, protect
"three types of patent claims: the process by which a product is
made, the product itself, and its use."3 5 Much of the controversy
surrounding process patents, particularly medical process patents,
is a result of the economic importance of utility patents and the
frequency with which they are granted.
A process patent claim is typically easier to draft than other
types of claims because it is analogous to writing a recipe for a
cookbook.36 "[T]he elements of a method claim.., are... acts or
manipulative steps that are performed upon an article, workpiece
or chemical substance."37
31 21 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 526 (Int'l ed., 1993).
32 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (1988). The statute defines a utility patent as "any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof..." 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
3 21 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 526 (Int'l ed., 1993).
' "A process consists of an act, operation, or step, or a series of thereof, performed upon
specified subject matter to produce a physical result." ROSENBERG, supra note 29, § 6.01[1].
' Linda Maher, The Patent Environment: Domestic and European Community
Frameworks for Biotechnology, 33 JURIMETRICS J. 67, 76 (1992).
3 ROBERT C. FABER, LANDIS ON MECHANICS OF PATENT CLAIM DRAFTING 99 (3d ed. 1990).371 Id. at 99-100. An example of a claim drafted for a process which was granted a patent
in 1993 follows:
A method of anesthetizing a patient comprising the steps of providing
a plurality of gas permeable tubes, providing means for injecting an
anesthetizing gas into the tubes, inserting the tubes within a blood vessel
and injecting an anesthetizing gas into the tubes so that the gas can
diffuse through the tubes into the blood steam [sic] to anesthetize the
patient.
Patent No. 5,207,640. Official Gazette Pat., 1993.
1995]
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III. ANALYSIS
A. COUNTRIES PROHIBITING MEDICAL PROCESS PATENTS
Banning all process patents would be within Congress' authority,
but it is inadvisable and unlikely that Congress will take such a
broad stance.38 Yet, Congress should consider a prohibition on
medical process patents alone. While medical devices would
maintain their patentable status, medical procedures, which are
nearly intangible39 because they last only as long as the doctor is
performing the procedures, would return to their pre-Scherer"
status. Through the prohibition of medical process patents,
Congress would respond to society's and the medical profession's
desire to make available effective health care at a reasonable cost
to the largest number of people requiring treatment.41
Other nations have already taken this step.42 "Methods of
diagnosis and medical treatment ... cannot be patented under
European law."43  Great Britain denies patent protection to
medical processes. 4' The British Parliament and the British
' See Burch, supra note 3, at 1162-63 (discussing Congress' progressive approach to
ensure patentability of all processes).
39 R.S. CRESPI, PATENTS: A BASIC GUIDE TO PATENTING IN BIOTECHNOLOGY 122, 122-23
(Sir James Baddiley et al. eds., 1988). Proving infringement is often a problem where
process patents are concerned. Id.
[I]t is [sometimes] difficult or impossible to tell from an examination of
the product what process has been used .... In biotechnology this
difficulty may be enhanced by the variability of living matter which
offers more scope for argument over the identity of biological systems
and the derivation of one from another.
Id. at 123.
o Ex parte Scherer, 103 U.S.P.Q. 107 (P.O. Bd. App. 1954). See supra note 28 and
accompanying text (discussing court's holding that medical and surgical methods are not
rendered unpatentable because they involve human body).
41 Innovation and Competition, supra note 13, at 183 (arguing that without applying
United States patent system to biomedical technologies, "the level of investment needed to
bring about the advances that will provide cures may fall off, and there may consequently
be fewer advances and, overall, fewer people cured"). Samuelson noted the irony in
American culture that our citizens "are often indifferent to the plight of the poor but find
their heartstrings pulled at the thought of the
poor being denied a chance of survival or cure that the rich can afford." Id.
42 Felsenthal, supra note 9, at B6. See generally Burch, supra note 3, at 1162-63.
CRESPI, supra note 39, at 75.
44Burch, supra note 3, at 1163.
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Courts have adhered to this outright prohibition. 5
In 1914, a British court declined to protect a method of extracting
metals from "living bodies."46 The court relied on ethics in
reasoning that medical processes were not patentable. 7 As
recently as 1975, the English courts found no reason to depart from
this rule which has endured over the years. 8 The court admitted
that the reasons for excluding these medical process claims from
patent protection were grounded in ethics and not logic, but noted
that if societal policies were to change, the law should be revised
by legislation and not by judicial interpretation.49
The British Parliament revised its patent laws in 1977, modeling
the laws after the European Patent Convention. ° However, these
laws still reflect a prohibition on medical process patents.51
New Zealand also denies patent protection for medical process-
es.52 The New Zealand Court of Appeals, grounding its decision
on ethics like the English courts, overruled a lower court's decision
to allow a patent claim for a new use of a known drug. 3 Although
this case did not involve a surgical procedure, a new use of a known
drug is analogous to allowing a patent on a procedure used to cure
a person.
The similarity lies in the fact that no new tangible invention is
involved, only the process of using an existing drug to treat an
ailment not previously known to be affected by a particular dosage
4Id.
"See Burch, supra note 3, at 1163 (citing C & W's Application, 31 R.P.D. & T.M. 235
(1914)).
47 Id.
'See Burch, supra note 3, at 1163 (citing Eli Lilly & Co.'s Application, 1975 R.P.D. &
T.M. 438).
' Id. (citing Eli Lilly, 1975 R.P.D. & T.M. at 438-39).
50 See Burch, supra note 3, at 1163 n.123 (stating "(m]ethods for treatment of the human
or animal body by surgery or therapy and diagnostic methods practised on the human or
animal body shall not be regarded as inventions... . (quoting Article 52(4), European Patent
Convention (Munich 1973) as amended Dec. 21, 1978, O.J. 3 (1979)).
"Id. (citing British Patent Act, 1977, pt. I, § 4(IX2)).
'3See Burch, supra note 3, at 1164 (citing Wellcome Found., Ltd. v. Commissioner of
Patents, 1983 N.Z.L.R. 385).
5
3
Id.
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of that drug." The court noted that the "art of... alleviating
human suffering does not belong to the area of economic endeavor
or trade and commerce."55 The court recognized that the United
States' patent system values industry and invention over humani-
ty.
56
B. COMPARISON OF PROCESSES
One major objection to a prohibition on medical process patents
is that no one will invent new processes because the inventor will
not be able to recoup his or her costs without a guaranteed period
of monopoly. 57 However, a study of firms in the United States
found patents were not a significant factor in research and
development decision making-"except when patent lawyers
prepared the responses."8
Yet, two industrialized nations have prospered without this
patent protection, one for almost a century. Further, researchers
in the United States have successfully and effectively developed
countless medical procedures without the aid of patent protection.
In contrast to those procedures developed in the United States
without patent protection, Surrogate Embryo Transfer (SET) is a
5 See generally ROSENBERG, supra note 29, at 6-10 (discussing validity of patent covering
new use for known drug in United States). Rosenberg illustrates how the United States
patent system requires that the method of use must
be new.
Although the analgesic properties of aspirin have long been recognized,
it is only recently that the effectiveness of aspirin in preventing heart
attacks has been established. If the dosages of aspirin and the intervals
of its administration to ward off a heart attack are the same as that for
which aspirin has been taken as an analgesic, such is but the discovery
of a heretofore unrecognized benefit which however meritorious would
not be patentable, as the method itself is old.
Id.
See Burch, supra note 3, at 1164 (quoting Wellcome Found., Ltd. v. Commissioner of
Patents, 1983 N.Z.L.R. 385).
w Id.
5 Burch, supra note 3, at 1164. "[Ellementary economic principles dictate that reducing
the potential reward to medical researchers will reduce concomitantly the pace of such
research." Id. But see Progress of Science, supra note 8, at 1031-32 (discussing studies
comparing countries with and without patent systems to determine effect on investment in
research and development).
w Progress of Science, supra note 8, at 1032.
170 [Vol. 3:161
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procedure patented in 1987."9 This procedure ultimately results
in a sterile woman giving birth to a child.' The corporation that
funded and developed the now-patented procedure will derive its
profits from clinics licensed to use the process. Each time a doctor
at a licensed clinic performs this procedure during the next 17
years, this company will profit as a result of the licensing agree-
ment.61
Proponents of medical process patents argue that the types of
processes under patent protection which currently exist in the
medical field are unnecessary62 or "rarely used' 3 and, therefore,
do not detrimentally impact society in the way opponents of such
patents fear.6 4 However, we take many basic procedures for
granted in today's high-tech society. Yet, substantial examples
exist where these procedures were born and developed without
patent protection. In fact, if open heart surgery were patented, it
would not have become a realistic option of treatment for most
Americans as quickly as it did.65
As early as the 1920's surgeons were developing techniques to
cure patients with severe heart problems. In Boston, Edward D.
Churchill treated and cured a patient suffering from chronic
"9 Patent No. 4,816,257. McCoy, supra note 16, at 507 n.32 (citing Burch, supra note 3,
at 1119-40). "The patent application... cites 28 biomedical process patents granted since
1975, either for pure process patents, or for broader patent claims with distinct process
elements." Id.
' McCoy, supra note 16, at 507.
61 Id.
' "Unnecessary" in that bearing children is not considered as important as saving a life
or curing an ailment; and, there are other more affordable, more traditional means to become
a parent, i.e. adoption.
" McCoy, supra note 16, at 508 (citing Annas, Surrogate Embryo Transfer: The Perils
of Patenting, 14 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 25 (June 1984)). Examples of medical processes that
are "rarely" used include: "method and apparatus for direct electrical injection of gold ions
into tissue such as bone"; "cranial insertion of surgical needle utilizing computer assisted
tomography"; "method for maintaining the reduction of a sliding esophageal hiatal hernia";
and "surgical method of fixation of artificial eye lenses." Id. at 508 n.40.
"McCoy, supra note 16, at 511 (noting that most medical process patents issued do not
relate to basic health care requirements). McCoy further argues that biomedical process
patents are not well suited "for the typical basic health care needs for which access
limitations would appear most unjust," because these basic health care measures would not
meet the statutory requirements of non-obviousness and novelty. Id.
6Cf. supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text (discussing effect of patent protection on
industry research and development decisions).
1995]
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constrictive pericarditis." Robert E. Gross, another Bostonian,
performed the first successful heart operation in 1938 where "a
patent (open) ductus arteriosis was ligated (tied off)."17 During
World War II, surgeons were able to perfect their techniques as a
result of the number of casualties requiring open heart surgery.'
Had the procedure been patented, the large number of physicians
performing these surgeries would have taken the procedure out of
the experimental use exemption. Therefore, in order to maintain
a patentable status, the physicians would not have been permitted
to employ this procedure to save the soldiers. The experimental
use exemption allows a patentee to ascertain "the sufficiency of the
machine [or the procedure] to produce its described effects."6 9
After World War II, Dwight Harkin and Charles Bailey continued
to develop open heart surgery to treat other ailments.70 In the
late 1940's the surgeons opened a narrowed mitral valve by
inserting a surgeon's finger into the valve through the left atri-
um.71  Throughout the following decade this surgical technique
was effective "in treating pulmonary edema and congestion in
thousands of patients throughout the world."
72
Although the proponents of medical process patents argue that
the cost 73 of the patented procedure will not affect patient access
to the procedure,74 a recently patented method illustrates a
" Paul Dudly White, M.D., Heart Surgery, in 14 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 12 (Int'l
ed. 1993). The procedure was performed in 1928. Id.
67 This method "became an almost routine and safe operation, and it is still widely used
today." Id.
SId.
Progress of Science, supra note 8, at 1023 (quoting Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas.
1120 (D. Mass. 1813)). It was only after a large number of surgeries were performed during
the war that the procedure became routine. Paul Dudly White, M.D., Heart Surgery, in 14
THE ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 12 (Int'l ed. 1993).70 PAUL DUDLEY WHITE, M.D., Heart Surgery, in 14 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 12
(Int'l ed. 1993).
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 See infra note 112 and accompanying text (discussing increased cost of patented
medical procedures).
71 See supra note 64 and accompanying text (noting that most medical process patents
do not relate to basic health care needs).
[Vol. 3:161172
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contrary conclusion.7" The method uses a polyp marking device
to remove polyps 76 often found in the colon, sinuses, or nose.
77
Polyps often develop into cancer and are typically removed upon
discovery.78 This method may not be classified as a "basic health
care requirement,"7' but many Americans would assume that most
doctors could offer this procedure in light of this country's aware-
ness of cancer, and the importance of its detection, prevention, and
treatment.
Yet the cost of this patented procedure will be substantially
higher than the current exhorbitant cost of health care prevailing
in the United States. The reason this procedure will be cost-
prohibitive for patients is because the cost reflects royalties,
negotiating licensing agreements and the prosecution of infringe-
ment suits.80 Some commentators argue that the patenting of
these medical procedures is acceptable because the patents are
granted infrequently and often cover procedures seldom used in
basic health care.8" This argument must fail in light of the
aforementioned example. The recently issued polyp marking patent
would help reduce bleeding in a routine polyp removal procedure.
The procedure's widespread desirability is, hence, obvious. The
PTO has also granted patents for two potentially life-saving
methods: a method for administering insulin; and a new method
for diagnosing a heart-beat disorder.8 2
'5 Patent No. 5,122,147. 1139, No. 3, Official Gazette, U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off. 1654
(June 16, 1992).
Polyp marking device and method
Surgical method and instrument such as a snare or forceps clamps,
which can be moved to a position to firmly grasp a polyp. A tissue
marking agent is disposed on the surface of the instrument that contacts
a polyp, and the marking agent is crushed against the polyp. The
marking agent is absorbed by the polyp and stains the tissue from which
the polyp projects.
Id.
76 A polyp is a growth projecting from the tissue, attached by a stem. Telephone
Interview with Lee D. Kaplan, M.D. (March 8, 1995).
77Id.
78 Id.
71 See supra note 64 and accompanying text (noting that most medical process patents
do not relate to basic health care needs).
' Felsenthal, supra note 9. See also infra notes 137-140 and accompanying text
(discussing patent costs).
8' McCoy, supra note 16, at 506.
82 Felsenthal, supra note 9.
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C. PATENTING COMPUTER PROGRAMS
At a glance, computer programs and medical procedures appear
to have nothing in common. However, upon closer examination, the
two have a common denominator. According to Lee D. Kaplan,
M.D., computer programs and surgical procedures are essentially
"like a cookbook recipe." m Both involve steps one must follow to
achieve the desired result; any variation may prove to be disas-
trous. Also, the steps in both are largely incremental, with the
latest inventions building on previously discovered processes.8
Notably, mental steps have rarely been patentable.'
The courts and the PTO have only recently struggled with the
question of whether computer software is patentable."M Medical
processes, much like computer programs, were originally denied
patent protection summarily. Both also met with substantial
success despite the lack of patent protection.87 If advocates of
medical process patenting examine the impact of patenting on the
computer software industry, they might be more careful in what
they wish for.88
' Telephone Interview with Lee D. Kaplan, M.D. (March 8, 1995).
84 "Patent law requires an inventive advance over the prior art before it grants
protection." Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of
Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308, 2346 (1994). "Protecting incremental
innovations in [computer] program behavior through patent law would thwart the economic
goals of the patent system: to grant exclusive rights only when an innovator has made a
substantial contribution to the art and advanced competition to a new level." Id.
s' Louis J. Knobbe, How to Decide Whether to Obtain a Patent: Legal Framework, PLI
PAT., COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, AND LITERARY PROP. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES No. G-343,
at 9, 46 1992.
'" See generally Knobbe, supra note 85, at 44-51 (discussing patentability of software).
87 MERGES, supra note 21, at 87. "It is noted that the creation of [computer] programs
has undergone substantial and satisfactory growth in the absence of patent protection...."
Id. (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 407 U.S. 63, 175 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 673 (1972)).
' "Those [patent] cases have hung over our collective heads like vipers about to strike,
diverting the energies of industry participants from developing new technologies to defending
old ones in courts, and heaping new loads of fear, uncertainty, and doubt onto the backs of
the user community." MERGES, supra note 21, at 88 (quoting Editorial, Patent Mania is
Hurting the Industry, 5 P.C. WEEK 38, July 18, 1988).
174 [Vol. 3:161
14
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [1995], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol3/iss1/6
1995] MEDICAL PROCESS PATENTS 175
The PTO employs a two-step analysis in reviewing patent
applications for software.89 The PTO first determines whether the
claim describes an algorithm.' If the claim describes an algo-
rithm, the PTO must then determine whether the algorithm is
preempted.9 When the claim defines a method or process rather
than an apparatus or system, the PTO employs an extended
analysis.92 Generally, if the claim simply describes a mathemati-
cal manipulation, the subject matter is not patentable.93
Medical process patents could be denied on a similar theory.
Certain actions involving the mind, which could be classified as
mental steps, are not prohibited patentable subjects by the case law
relating to purely mental steps.94 However, in In re Meyer,95 a
claim describing a method and apparatus for a diagnostic or
memory aid for a neurologist was rejected. 6 The claimed inven-
tion essentially replaced a neurologist's thinking process with a
89 Knobbe, supra note 85, at 44-51. This analysis is commonly referred to as the
Freeman-Walter two-step analysis. Id. The analysis is "based upon two decisions of the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals: In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237 (C.C.P.A. 1978), and
in In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758 (C.C.P.A. 1980)." Id.
90 Knobbe, supra note 85, at 45. "[An algorithm question includes both claims that recite
a computer or other apparatus operating in accordance with a mathematical formula or a
series of steps determined by a mathematical formula, but also claimed subject matter which
indirectly claims an algorithm." Id.
91 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972). See generally supra note 84 and accompany-
ing text (discussing requirement of inventive advance for patent protection). To avoid
preemption, the claim must recite structural elements or steps apart from the algorithm
elements or steps because an algorithm is not patentable. Knobbe, supra note 85, at 48-51.
92 Knobbe, supra note 85, at 44-51.
93Id. at 51.
" Ex parte McNabb, 127 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 456 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1959). See Knobbe,
supra note 85, at 44.
The Patent Office Board of Appeals distinguished between 'use of the
human eyes for detection or determination of any condition, such as
temperature, pressure, time, etc. and/or the use of the hands for the
purpose of manipulating.., as to produce a certain result necessarily
involves the human mind and hence can be classed as a mental step.
Such steps, however, are not purely mental or interpretive steps and are
not the kind which are prohibited by the decisions relating to purely
mental steps.'
Knobbe, supra note 85, at 44 (quoting Ex parte McNabb, 127 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 456 (Pat. Off.
Bd. of App. 1959)).
95 688 F.2d 789, 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 193 (C.C.P.A. 1982). See generally Knobbe, supra
note 85, at 44 (discussing patentability of software).
"Id. See generally Knobbe, supra note 85, at 44 (discussing patentability of software).
15
Douglass: Medical Process Patents: Can We Live Without Them? Should we?
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 1995
J. INTELL. PROP. L.
computer.97 The claim also recited "a mathematical algorithm
which represents a mental process that a neurologist should
follow."98 The court concluded that the mathematical algorithm,
which represented a mental process but was not applied to physical
elements or process steps, was "not limited to any otherwise
statutory process."99 Therefore, the court upheld the rejection of
the patent for the claimed invention.
The United States Supreme Court has yet to "entirely eliminate
the mental step doctrine from current law.""°  Therefore, the
PTO and the lower courts will subject patent claims that arguably
include mental steps, such as those claiming medical processes, to
a higher level of scrutiny. 1°' Because medical processes are
similar to a computer program in that they both represent a mental
process, the medical process claims have a higher probability of
rejection. In fact, Professor Alan Newell, a "prominent computer
scientist and pioneer in the field of machine or 'artificial' intelli-
gence, [notes that] the main line of progress in psychology... has
been to describe human behavior as computational.... [H]umans
think by means of algorithms. Sequences of mental steps and
algorithms are the same thing."
0 2
Commentators have noted that the PTO does not often grant
medical process patents for basic health care needs.0 3 Their
conclusions could arguably be based on the courts' and the PTO's
treatment of the mental steps doctrine. The fact that some medical
processes are not so broad as to encompass a large number of
treatments should not preclude them from the PTO's stricter
"' Knobbe, supra note 85, at 44 (quoting In re Meyer, 688 F.2d 789 (C.C.P.A. 1982)).
8 Id.
Id. at 44-46 (quoting In re Meyer, 688 F.2d 789 (C.C.P.A. 1982)).
" MERGES, supra note 21, at 52. See Knobbe, supra note 85, at 46 (discussing
patentability of software).
101 Knobbe supra note 85, at 46.
102 MERGES, supra note 21, at 54 (quoting Alan Newell, The Models Are Broken, The
Models Are Broken, 47 U. Prrr. L. REV. 1023, 1025 (1986)). Newell uses an example to
illustrate the effect of allowing patents for algorithms. "If algorithms are patentable, [and
one wanted to patent addition] the patentee could keep [a person] from doing addition with
the algorithms invented for it. There would be ever so many things that the poor would not
be able to do, such as add up their grocery bill." Id. at 55 (quoting Newell, The Models Are
Broken, The Models Are Broken, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 1023, 1027).
103 See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text (noting that patents for medical
processes are arguably only granted for "rarely used" procedures).
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scrutiny. Even though the claims for these processes may recite
structural elements or steps in addition to the mental step,'04 the
patent should still be rejected. The basis of the rejection could lie
in a failure to meet the non-obviousness requirement of the Patent
Act.1 5 A medical process invention fails to become non-obvious
because the additional steps in the claim would be obvious given
the underlying mental steps of the procedure. In fact, commenta-
tors arguing for protection of software beyond what the patent
system offers are dissatisfied with the emerging case law on non-
obviousness and its effect on biotechnological process patents.
1°6
Their dissatisfaction lies in the "judicial tendency to deny protec-
tion to costly biotechnological processes that yield major commercial
and societal gains." 7
Therefore, medical processes, like software programs, may be
denied patent protection. Both are created by building on incre-
mental steps and by definition are obvious.
D. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
1. Societal. The most troubling aspect of patenting medical
processes is that the patent inevitably denies treatment to some
patients who cannot afford the procedure0 8 while it denies
treatment to others whose doctors are not licensed to perform the
procedure.0 9 Although the aggregate effect of the Patent Act is
104 See supra note 91 and accompanying text (discussing how claim involving algorithm
avoids preemption and becomes patentable).
'o5 To become patented, an invention may not be obvious at the time it was invented. 35
U.S.C. § 103 (1988). An invention fails the non-obviousness test "if the differences between
the subject matter sought to be patented & the prior art are such that the subject matter as
a whole would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said
subject matter pertains." Id. Cf. Brian C. Cannon, Note, Toward a Clear Standard of
Obviousness for Biotechnology Patents, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 735, 736 (1994) (arguing that
nonobviousness requirement is met when "a claimed biotechnology invention is unattainable
through use of reasonably accessible scientific methods").
" J.H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 2432, 2471 (1994).107 Id.
" The cost of patented procedures is often elevated resulting from the collection of
royalties and from the cost of prosecuting or defending actions for validity or infringement.
Felsenthal, supra note 9. Legal action could cost the parties millions of dollars. Id. See also
infra notes 137-140 and accompanying text (discussing patent costs).
"o9 See infra notes 130-154 and accompanying text (discussing licensing agreements).
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to promote inventions and discoveries by granting a monopoly,11
one cannot ignore the impact on the discrete field of medicine and
treatment of the human body."' The increase in price resulting
from a monopoly is simply not as offensive in other industries as it
is in the medical field. Those who promote medical process patents
and have adequate medical insurance may feel as though this
problem of increased pricing for patented procedures does not affect
their treatment. They are wrong. For instance, insurance only
covers procedures costing a customary & reasonable fee." 2
However, medical procedures that are patented involve costs much
higher than what is considered customary and reasonable."'
2. Doctor/Patient. Not only will society feel the financial pinch
of costlier and less widely available procedures, but the individual
patients could receive biased diagnoses and treatment plans. The
doctor-patient relationship has been a coveted association through-
out the years."4 The issuance of process patents could seriously
undermine this relationship which is based on the mutual goals of
doctor and patient to heal and to be healed." 5
110 Felsenthal, supra note 9. See also infra notes 137-140 and accompanying text
(discussing patent costs).
. It is unlikely that a court in the United States would invalidate a patent or that the
PTO would deny issuance of a patent on ethical grounds alone. But see supra notes 38-56
and accompanying text (discussing statutory and common law prohibition of medical process
patents in foreign nations).
112 Telephone Interview with Customer Service Representative, Blue Cross/Blue Shield
of Georgia (Feb. 2, 1995). To determine the amount of coverage on a particular procedure,
the company employs a "procedure code" to determine the customary and reasonable fee
which is based on the average cost charged by participating providers. For those with an
individual policy, experimental procedures are not covered at all; however, not all patented
procedures are characterized as experimental. For those covered under a group policy, the
group could contract to cover experimental procedures. But, group coverage could not affect
the customary and reasonable fee charged by physicians, which may not be reasonable at all
if royalties are involved. Id.
... Supra note 21.
1" Much of the trust patients have in their doctors stems from the oath every doctor must
take before he begins practicing. The Hippocratic Oath requires doctors "to practice 'for the
benefit of the sick according to ... [their] ability and judgment.'" Burch, supra note 3, at
1152 n.78.
115 See generally Burch, supra note 3, at 1152-57 (discussing physician autonomy and
physician-patient confidentiality as ethical objections to medical process patents). For a
detailed article outlining the major ethical objections to medical process patents, see McCoy,
supra note 16 (concluding that ethical objections presented do not outweigh need to
encourage innovation through patents).
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In an ideal world, the doctor who holds a process patent, or who
is licensed to perform a patented procedure, would choose a
particular procedure to treat a patient solely because it would be
the best and most effective way to cure that patient. However, in
the world of medical process patents, that doctor's otherwise ideal
judgment may be skewed in favor of a patented process.
For example, an anesthesiologist may choose a patented method
to anesthetize a patient for general surgery. 116 The only practical
difference between the patented method and the traditional method
is that the patented method involves a gas, instead of a liquid,
anesthetizing agent. Although there is no real benefit in using the
gaseous agent instead of the liquid,117 the doctor may use the gas
because he has a license from the patentee and wants to recoup the
initial cost he paid to obtain the license. In another scenario, the
doctor may be the patentee and wants to gain recognition for a new
method. Therefore, he uses the method on all his patients even
though it is more expensive, since he is trying to recoup his
research and development costs. 118
One district court found that the ethical objections to patenting
medical processes outweighed any need for a patent monopoly. 119
The court reasoned:
Doctors and surgeons have seldom thought it desir-
able to patent their new procedures for human relief.
... The professional ethics of doctors and surgeons
are more consistent with the widespread use of their
medical and surgical discoveries for the benefit of
mankind than in obtaining a monopoly to control
their discoveries for personal commercial advantage.
In this respect it would seem also that public interest
is involved." 2 °
11 See Faber, supra note 37 and accompanying text (discussing recently patented method
for anesthetizing patient).
17 Telephone Interview with Lee D. Kaplan, M.D. (March 8, 1995).
11 See Burch, supra note 57 and accompanying text (discussing costs of research and
development).
"0 See generally Norms of Science, supra note 16, at 187 nn.49-50 (citing Martin v. Wyeth,
Inc., 96 F. Supp. 689 (D. Md. 1951), affd 193 F.2d 58 (4th Cir. 1951)).
'20 Norms of Science, supra note 16, at 187 (quoting Martin, 96 F. Supp. at 695). But see
Felsenthal, supra note 9, at B6 ("That's where the money is.... This encourages people to
sit down with a glass of scotch and think up new ideas," [said an attorney representing a
patentee of a medical process]).
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3. Impact on Research/ Universities. Medical process patents
also appear to be at odds with the goals and beliefs of the scientific
community. 121 In general, the scientific community aims to make
findings available to others for scrutiny, in order to facilitate the
progress of science. 122  This attitude is especially prevalent in
biotechnology, resulting from the belief that new information
should be disseminated "in order to serve humanity."123  Re-
searchers are more likely to discover or perfect a medical procedure
when their colleagues can share ideas and tinker with the intrica-
cies of the process.
Not only are subsequent discoveries more likely when free access
is the norm, but also, the incentive system in place within the
scientific community promotes free publication and dissemination
of new observations.'24  The scientific community offers an
incentive for a scientist to make his claims freely available to other
researchers by awarding him recognition. 25  Counter to this
reward structure, where the scientist gains recognition for the
discovery once that discovery is publicized, the patent system
"promotes investment in innovation by providing exclusive rights
in inventions."26
The following is an example of how the greed incentive of the
patent system can undermine the sharing nature of the scientific
community. "Two research scientists at UCLA [University of
California at Los Angeles], Golde and Koeffler, gave Gallo, a
researcher at the National Cancer Institute, a valuable sample of
121 Progress of Science, supra note 8, argues for an experimental use exemption from
patent infringement liability for research science. "The idea that exclusive rights in new
knowledge will promote scientific progress is counterintuitive to many observers of research
science, who believe that science advances most rapidly when the community enjoys free
access to new discoveries." Id. at 1017. An example of how patent protection can stifle
innovation is found where a company, which owned a patent covering an enzyme that
dissolves bloodclots in heart attack patients, sued companies trying to improve the clotbuster
based on the enzyme. Gary Slutsker & David C. Churbuck, Whose Invention Is It Anyway?,
FORBES, Aug. 19, 1991, at 114. The company owning the enzyme patent won and forced the
improvers to cease their research. Id.
122 Norms of Science, supra note 16, at 182.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 206-07.
'25 Id. at 218.
126 Id.
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cancerous cells they had succeeded in growing."12 7 Gallo then
passed it on to "a scientist friend working for a biotech company
who found a way to make use of those cells in the production of
interferon."12 A dispute later arose which ended in an out-of-
court settlement. "Golde is reported as saying, 'Everything has
changed. The exchange of materials is different. They now have
value. To send out a cell line for some experiment is like sending
out a twenty-carat diamond to cut some glass.' "129
E. LICENSING
The most troubling aspect of patent law as applied to medical
processes is that a monopoly is granted to the inventor for 17
years. 30 The inventor may then withhold use of that process at
his discretion. 131 In such exclusivity lies the assumption that
patents will promote inventions.
Essentially, a patentee, whether a doctor, researcher or hospital,
may choose to exploit an invention in different ways: "directly as
a monopolist to suppress the invention entirely, or to license others
to exploit the invention ... in exchange for royalties." 32 The
patentee, however, is not required to extend licenses.
133
Some commentators have argued against mandatory licensing in
the field of medical process patents. 34 The argument for manda-
tory licensing is worth noting because mandatory licensing "limits
the monopoly effect of a medical process patent. " 135 However, it
is too extreme to become a reality in the near future. Congress has
only required mandatory licensing in two areas where detailed
1 27 LEONARD G. BOONIN, THE UNIVERSITY, SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH, AND THE OWNERSHIP OF
KNOWLEDGE 253, 263 (1978).
1n8/d.
129 id.
130 See supra note 21 and accompanying text (discussing rights available to inventors
under Patent Act upon full disclosure of invention).
' See infra notes 132-133 and accompanying text (discussing ways patentee may exploit
invention).
132 Norms of Science, supra note 16, at 217.
133 Id. See also MILGRIM, supra note 6, § 8.50, at 8-161 (stating "[a] unilateral refusal to
license is generally not regarded as misuse or violation of the antitrust laws").
134 See Burch, supra note 3, at 1169-71 (discussing reasons to oppose mandatory
licensing).
"s Burch, supra note 3, at 1167.
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statutes already require progress."' The following discussion
envisions a more attainable goal.
In attempting to soften the harsh effects of the right to patent
medical processes through responsible licensing, one must first
examine the largest problem-soaring health care costs-caused by
these patents to discern whether it is a problem worth remedying.
Health care costs are generally considered too high, but they have
the potential to soar as more medical processes are patented.
Increases in health care costs are inevitable when these processes
are patented. Not only is there a maintenance fee to keep the
patent in effect, 13v litigation to protect the patent from alleged
infringers is costly.138  Even assuming a moderate maintenance
fee and no litigation, a patentee may still charge exorbitant
royalties 139 with the leverage of the monopoly weighing in his or
her favor. 4 ° The amount a patentee chooses to charge is not
subject to judicial scrutiny under either antitrust14 1 or misuse
" Congress requires compulsory licensing in areas such as atomic energy (42 U.S.C. §§
2182-90) and air pollution (42 U.S.C. § 7608 et seq.). Thomas A. Dietierich, Patents and
Antitrust: An Overview, in PATENT ANTITRUST 42 (1980) (citing Wisconsin Alumni Research
Found. v. Vitamin Technologists, Inc., 146 F.2d 941 (9th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 876
(1945); City of Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge, Inc., 69 F.2d 577 (7th Cir. 1933), cert. denied,
293 U.S. 576 (1934)). "In some instances, where a patent relates to public health or safety,
courts have refused to enjoin infringement and merely permitted the patentee to recover
damages .... Such decisions would seem to be equivalent to compulsory licensing at a
reasonable royalty." Id.
137 Patent Act § 41 (b). See also MILGRIM, supra note 6, § 2.61, at 2-63 (noting costs of
maintaining patents).
138 MILGRIM, supra note 6, § 2.63, at 2-64. "A moderately complex patent litigation can
be expected to cost (in 1990 dollars) between $500,000 to $1,000,000 in legal fees and
associated expenses for each side. Fees of several million dollars or more are not rare." Id.
Milgrim notes that patent license agreements would be an excellent cost-avoidance technique
for potential litigants to resolve their differences. Id.
139 "[T]he notion of royalty is a current payment, typically related to use, in exchange for
which the patentee ... currently refrains from suing the licensee for conduct which, but for
the license, would be infringement.' MILGRIM, supra note 6, § 8.07, at 8-29.
140 MILGRIM, supra note 6, § 8.03, at 8-15 (citing Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 33
(1964), reh'g denied, 379 U.S. 985 (1965)); see also ROBERT P. TAYLOR, ANTITRUST ASPECTS
OF PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 7, at 13 (JanIFeb. 1982) (noting that holding in
Brulotte allows patentee to charge royalties at whatever rate market will bear).
14 However, the theories behind antitrust law and those behind patent law do coincide.
Richard W. McLaren, Patent Licenses and Antitrust Considerations, in CURRENT ANTITRUST
PROBLEMS IN ACQUIRING AND LICENSING PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND TECHNOLOGY 49, 50
(1969). "The patent law seeks to stimulate innovation through reward; the antitrust law
seeks to preserve innovation through competition." Id. at 51. Practices condemned under
22
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theories.142 Our nation's health care crisis, coupled with the
increased likelihood for issuance and validation of medical process
patents requires that influential organizations intervene.
The influence of organizations such as the American Medical
Association will undeniably be limited. They could, however,
campaign for more reasonable licensing agreements and encourage
licensing of all patented inventions." Nonetheless, state
contract law, with the cooperation of state licensing boards and
individual hospitals, can more effectively lessen the effects of
medical process patents.
State contract law, by governing licensing agreements, is one way
to bypass review by the pro-patent United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit. A patent's validity is normally determined
by the federal judiciary. 44 Yet, licensing agreements between a
patentee and a licensee that determine amount of royalties and the
scope of use are contracts.145 These contracts are subject to
scrutiny under state contract law when a dispute arises. 4" The
state court, given jurisdiction over the dispute, may determine
issues of patent infringement and patent validity.'47
the antitrust laws include "tying the sale of patented products to the purchase of unpatented
material, agreements to refrain from challenging the validity of patents under which no
license has been granted, agreements not to deal in goods which compete with products
covered by the patent, and the like." Id.14 2 MILGRIM, supra note 6, § 8.06, at 8-27 (citing Brullotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964),
reh'g denied, 379 U.S. 985 (1965)).
143 Supra note 12.
14 MILGRIM, supra note 6, § 2.68, at 2-67.
14 Id.
'" Id. The Patent Act also makes clear that a "contract involving a patent [a licensing
agreement] ... may contain a provision requiring arbitration of disputes concerning patent
validity or infringement." Warner & Swasey Co. v. Salvagnini Transferica S.p.A., 633 F.
Supp. 1209, 1212 n.2, 230 U.S.P.Q. 682 (W.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 294). However,
some cases hold that when relief is sought under the patent laws, contract law questions will
not defeat federal subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 1212.
'
47 A licensee may challenge the validity of a patent. Gerald Sobel, The Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit: A Fifth Anniversary Look at its Impact on Patent Law and Litigation,
37 AM. U.L. REV. 1087, 1103-04 (1988) (discussing Lear v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969)
(holding that provision in licensing agreement prohibiting licensee from challenging validity
of patent was unenforceable)). See also H. Thomas Austern, Problems in Licensing, in
CuRRENT ANTITRUST PROBLEMS IN ACQUIRING AND LICENSING PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND
TECHNOLOGY 41, 45 (1969) (discussing Lear and noting that court declared "that the
important public interest in permitting full and free competition in the use of ideas
outweighs the equities of the licensor"); MILGRIM, supra note 6, § 2.69, at 2-69. The validity
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In addition, state physician licensing boards could encourage
reasonable licensing agreements. The patent laws, and judicial
interpretation thereof, allow a patentee broad discretion in setting
the price and limiting the method of sale of the patent.4 '
Because the state licensing board controls the number of doctors
admitted to practice in the state and has the power to suspend or
revoke licenses, the board's views on reasonable licensing provi-
sions are persuasive. The board might enlist a committee to review
agreements regarding a medical patent solely consisting of a
process. The board might also offer an administrative remedy to
licensees challenging an oppressive agreement. The board should
also encourage widespread licensing at a reasonable cost, as
opposed to limiting licenses to the few doctors who have the
resources to engage in licensing opportunities. 49 Although the
board can only reach physician patentees, it is a small step in the
right direction.
Individual hospitals may also encourage responsible licensing.
Most non-research/teaching hospitals could include a provision
regarding the patenting of medical processes in the employment
contract granting physician privileges to a doctor or group of
doctors. The provision could specify that any discoveries made
during the course of employment would be made for the benefit and
use of the hospital.15 ° The theory behind the hospital receiving
of the patent could potentially be decided by a foreign court if the license agreement contains
a forum selection clause. Id. at 2-70 n.217 (citing Warner & Swasey Co. v. Salvagnini
Transferica S.p.A., 633 F. Supp. 1209, 1211-14 (W.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding that "purported
patent infringement action ... was essentially a contract dispute and public policy favored
selection of the bargained-for venue provisions7--venue selected was Italy)).
148 United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926) (holding that patentee may set
price and limit method of sale). See also MILGRIM, supra note 6, § 7.11, at 7-19 (stating that
"[Tihe [Department of Justice] has concluded that licensing principles permit the owner of
patents and other technology to enjoy a wide latitude of restrictive practices in ... economic
implementation").
149 Although the patentee, "once he embarks on a licensing program, [does not retain]
absolute discretion in deciding to whom he shall license, the general rule is that a patentee
has the discretion to grant or withhold a license as he sees fit." United States v. Huck Mfg.
Co., 227 F. Supp. 791, 800, 140 U.S.P.Q. 554 (E.D. Mich. 1964), affd per curiam, 382 U.S.
197, 147 U.S.P.Q. 404 (1965) (4-4) (quoted from MILGRIM, supra note 6, § 8.04, at 8-20 n.42).
" The doctor actually making the discovery would, of course, receive a nominal bonus.
Companies that regularly patent tangible goods often offer a bonus when the patent is
issued. See infra note 151 and accompanying text (discussing bonus systems employed by
larger corporations).
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MEDICAL PROCESS PATENTS
the benefits of the patent is that the institution provided the
facilities that allowed the doctor to experiment.15 '
By allowing the hospital to hold the patent, licensing fees could
decrease because the hospital is in a better position to market and
license to other hospitals nationwide. A hospital is less likely to
exploit the patent as a monopolist because the hospital would gain
the most recognition by training licensees at the hospital's direc-
tion. Training could be available through nationwide conferences
and seminars. Doctors across the nation would then attribute a
higher level of expertise to the patentee/hospital.'52 Also, a
hospital does not have a personal attachment to the procedure and
would be less likely to deny another doctor or hospital a patent for
personal or arbitrary reasons.
Another benefit of allowing the hospital to hold the patent is that
it could reduce the ultimate cost of the procedure. Typically, the
most expensive phase of obtaining a patent is encountered at the
research and development stage. 53  A hospital, rather than an
individual physician, would have easier access to equipment, funds,
and personnel. Also, many companies were trimming their
research and development budgets before the advent of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit because patents
were not treated favorably.5 4 Although the treatment of patents
has become more favorable since 1982, with the creation of
appellate patent jurisdiction, companies are now more likely to
hoard their own resources than to invest in an outside physician
because this is the most efficient way to recoup research and
development costs.
1' Telephone Interview with Gary W. Douglass, Project Engineer, Pratt & Whitney (Mar.
11, 1995). Pratt & Whitney
is a company that manufactures gas turbine engines for aircraft. Douglass said that
inventors within the company receive a bonus of $1000 for a patentable invention. The
company, however, collects royalties well in excess of any employee bonus.
12 This notion of gaining recognition in the scientific community often conflicts with the
goals of the patent system. Norms of Science, supra note 16. But, by giving hospitals control
of the patent, these conflicting views are a step closer to compromise.
" MiLGRIM, supra note 6, § 2.59, at 2-62.154 id.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The importance of health care, the traditional sharing nature of
the scientific community and the successful development of medical
procedures without patent protection, call for an incremental
movement toward reducing the effects of the issuance of these
patents. The first step is to encourage responsible and reasonable
licensing. The ultimate goal of prohibition on medical process
patents will certainly meet resistance. Prohibition may not become
a reality for years or even decades. However, reasonable licensing
will at least pacify those who currently realize the value of patent-
free medical processes until the goal of prohibition is realized.
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